. A cross-cultural reflection on Shusterman's suggestion of the "Transactional" body.
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The meaning of Shusterman's "transactional whole of body-mind" is supplemented by his further elaboration of the "three interpenetrating levels" (the physical, psychophysical and mental levels), the complexity and intimacy of which increase in relation to their interactions with an organism. 7 Shusterman begins by analyzing the complexity of the physical level, observing that an organism organizes complex physical materials and energies as a means of survival. At the psychophysical level, he demonstrates how Dewey argues that emotion is a combination of distinct cognitive perceptions and bodily reactions that underline the basic unity of purposive behavior. At the mental level, he mentions Dewey's linguistic requirement for the mind, which situates it in the realm of culture. In this way, he explains the levels' high degrees of complexity, and suggests that interpenetration occurs when the human mind is not opposed to but is an emergent expression of the human body; when ideas and emotional excitation are constituted at the same time and when culture is not a contradictory force but rather a fulfilling and reshaping one. Shusterman's discussion of habits reveals a deeper meaning of the transactional whole of body-mind. His explication of habits illustrates his thesis that "mental and bodily reactions are not two different things in search of a philosophical synthesis but are instead analytical abstractions already enveloped in the primal unity of purposive behavior." 9 According to Shusterman and Dewey, habits involve the interpenetration of the emotional, cognitional and physiological levels. One must recognize that the notion of habit has undergone changes since the 19th century, the period to which Dewey's line of thought was applied. In the later half of the 19th century, theories of habit beat around the biologically based theories of mind, and explained habit as the tendency of the mind to reinforce mental patterns as a closed system and drive the individual to repetitive, automatic behavior to conserve energy. This explanation made individuals afraid that they were trapped in predictable and inflexible behavior that forbade their free will and ability to change. Chaplin's film Modern Times, human behavior during that era is now considered mass-produced. This historical reality has initiated changes in the reading of habit along with its complexity and integration.
From the discourse of habit, Shusterman analyzes the interpenetration of the will, behavior and environment, which cannot be reduced to the mental, physical and psychophysical. Shusterman observes that the will cannot be an entirely autonomous and purely mental construct because it is constituted by habits, which always incorporate environmental features. 12 The will and habit are tied in such a way that it is hard to differentiate the two or determine their priority. According to Shusterman, "a habit [is] before an ability to evoke the thought at will … will is deeply enmeshed in habit. the fullest extension and development, the result will be like fire beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot forth. When they are fully developed, they will be sufficient to protect all people within the four seas ( the world). If they are not developed, they will not be sufficient even to serve one's parents. (2A:
6)
The "Four Beginnings" are the four fundamental forms of moral knowledge, that is, the liang-chih. These forms comprise feelings and sentiments of compassion, shame, modesty and reverence, and include distinctions between right and wrong.
They are natural and universal, and produce virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom, respectively. They also drive the inclination to act appropriately when the moral subject interacts with others. Mencius considers liang-chih to be the ontological foundation of the virtues, and observes that it must be nurtured and preserved. Feelings and sentiments represent the potential for moral action in the development of a person into a whole human being who is in harmony with all of humankind. 22 The following passage considers the integration and interaction of the moral mind and the social world, and introduces the effect of the body's "vital force":
(Mencius:) The will is the leader of the vital force, and the vital force pervades and animates the body. The will is the highest; the vital force comes next.
Therefore, I say, 'hold the will firm and never do violence to the vital force' … If the will is concentrated, the vital force [will follow it] and become active. If the vital force is concentrated, the will [will follow it] and become active … If nourished by uprightness and not injured, it (i.e., the vital force) will fill up all between heaven and earth. As power, righteousness and the Way (or Dao)
The "vital force" (qi refers to bodily substance, matter and desire. It is neither the will nor the moral mind exclusively, but both interrelated in the sense that the moral mind should govern qi, or virtue will fail. This is a crucial point for humanity. Through the self-conscious effort to act according to moral principle, such as when the qi is guided by righteousness (yi), the righteous act naturally 22 The explications provided here are taken from Cheng Chung-ying, vital force, where moral knowledge and its capabilities must be developed and preserved through the physical to transform the human subject into a "great person" or sage. satisfactory; a problem receives its solution … Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience … Nevertheless, the experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement. This artistic structure may be immediately felt. In so far, it is esthetic."
Under the influences of biological evolutionism and his beliefs in functional and pragmatic implications, Dewey states that the activities of living things are characterized by natural needs, by the efforts to satisfy those needs and by satisfactions. These terms are primarily implemented in a biological sense as described in his work Experience and Nature:
29
By need is meant a condition of tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium. By demand or effort is meant … [to] modify environing bodies in ways which react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored. By satisfaction is meant this recovery of equilibrium pattern, consequent upon the changes of environment due to interactions with the active demands of the organism.
It is interesting to note how Dewey expands the satisfaction of experience to aesthetic experience, which is often considered spontaneous, unexpected, fresh, unpredictable, purposive and instrumental, rather than the classical notion of "disinterestedness" that aesthetic experience implies: 30 "A consummatory object that is not also instrumental turns in time to the dust and ashes of boredom. The 'eternal' quality of great art is its renewed instrumentality for further consummatory experiences."
Jeffery Petts explains Dewey's notion of "consummation" as a job felt to be satisfactorily completed, a problem felt to be solved and a game played through "fair and square." He claims accordingly that aesthetic experience is a feeling that things are "just so." 31 However, he also hints that this feeling that things are "just so" has an implication of value, for it is both prompted and validated by a felt response or feeling 1 0 of approbation, and introduces the possibility of many kinds of motives and interests, ranging from physical needs to emotional desires, personal interests and aesthetic evaluations. Petts stresses that an aesthetic experience is privately felt but intrinsically public, as it takes on value when it is marked by a consummating moment. 32 Petts is of a similar mind to Dewey and Shusterman in terms of believing that human experience in full is extensional and transactional:
33 "My argument, in short, is that aesthetic experience is not simply a socially constructed response to environment … but is defining of a more profound natural (to be explained) response of human beings to their environment, without which it would be inexplicable how any cultural preferences could emerge from that experience."
As Shusterman suggests, cross-cultural study would enrich the reading of the transactional body, and he particularly refers to consulting Asian thought for a deeper understanding. The Deweyan model represents a belief in the biological and natural needs of a human subject, from which a full existential experience involving the mind, psyche and body (like an aesthetic experience) may arise as an intense, direct, immediate and integrated manifestation of the interaction of humans and the natural living environment. The feeling that things are "just so" represents fulfillment, describes the value of human experience and refers to equilibrium and harmony attained through interaction and adjustment. This connection is the foundation of the later expansion of works to the social, linguistic and cultural dimensions and to interaction.
In terms of Mencius, the feeling that things are "just so" has at least two levels. The first refers to moments when the vital force is regulated in a way that the tendency of behavioral practice accords with the moral mind. The second refers to the distanced accordance of the human mind to Heaven, where the latter confers a principle of morality that only a human could manifest. This level is both humanistic and cosmic.
In the Deweyan sense, happiness or delight achieved on a biological level should be different from that achieved on the metaphysical level implied in the Confucian ontology. The former lacks depth in terms of the meaning of ultimate concern for things and their value. However, Shusterman and Petts refer to a transactional body and experience that is in touch with the plane of value both naturally and socially.
32 Ibid., 67.
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One can also detect the harmonious state in the moral and aesthetic experiences in the Confucian thoughts, yet the differences between them and the Deweyan model are both epistemological and metaphysical. While the "just so" or the rightness described by Dewey refers to the successful adjustment between the subject and the living environment, the "just so" in the Confucian thinking is an ontological manifestation of things under the light of the human mind, when it is engaged with the metaphysical Nature and Heaven. This explains the suggestions made by Dewey's followers like Beardsley, who discusses the aesthetic values of aesthetic objects in terms of the measurement of intensity, coherence, integrity and complexity of the aesthetic experience. Yet if the happiness or delight in the Deweyan sense is based on a biological dimension, it should be different from that being at the spiritual level or in the light of the wisdom implied in the Confucian ontology. In brief, successful environmental adjustment is not equal to an answer related to art and value.
It should be noted that both the Deweyan and the Confucian models share the view that aesthetic experience in the broad sense comes prior to all other human experience.
For Dewey, an experience arises that has a satisfying emotional quality as it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement is an aesthetic structure itself, which may be immediately felt and it enables an intellectual (and a moral) experience to be complete. 34 The Confucian tradition reads aesthetic experience as an upsurge from the life experience itself, when the mind has the capacity only when it is totally engaged with the Nature.
The quests for human purpose and the meaning of life must obviously extend beyond environmental interaction and to the capacity of the human mind for hope and potential. Confucian thought dictates that the human mind is able to transcend the subject-object relationship and is engaged with Nature. For Dewey, bodily experience that has a satisfying emotional quality (because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement) may be immediately felt, and enables a complete intellectual (and moral) experience. 1 2 mental levels of a human being, and refers to the individual's private and public lives.
In "The End of Aesthetic Experience," Shusterman identifies the worry that people are losing the capacity for deep experience and feeling in the new age of living. 36 The notion of the transactional body elaborated in his somaesthetics and his reference to Mencius' theory may provide a way to reflect on the reconstruction of human experience, and the Confucian body discourse confirms its possible integration and transaction.
It is worthwhile to do this comparative study not only for illustration and confirmation purposes, but to enlarge our thinking horizon of the relation among self, object and our environment. Shusterman once called for rekindling the notion of aesthetic experience with the beliefs that the experience embraces heightened, meaningful, and valuable phenomenological experience; its importance and richness should be fuller recognized as it will be strengthened and preserved the more it is experienced; its concept is directional and is able to remind us of what is worth seeking in art and elsewhere in life. 37 In the Confucian's reading, the aesthetic experience happens in the engagement of the human mind with the metaphysical Nature provides alternative yet in-depth revelations to the points that Shusterman once raised. 
